Overview

Dr. Bondy joined the Department in 2018, having previously held limited term positions as Assistant Professor at Saint Mary’s University, Brandon University, and Trent University, and a Postdoctoral Fellowship at Cornell University. His primary research interests are in contemporary epistemology, including especially the nature and normative force of epistemic reasons and rationality, the epistemic basing relation, epistemic luck, epistemic paternalism, epistemic injustice, and epistemological problems of peer disagreement and deep disagreement.

Ph.D. McMaster University (2012)

Academic Interests and Expertise

Epistemology, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Formal and Informal Logic

Publications

Select publications

Books

• Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity (2018, Routledge)
• Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation (2020, Routledge, co-edited with J. Adam Carter)

Book Chapters

• “The Informal Logic Approach to Argumentation.” (2026, The Routledge Handbook of Argumentation Theory. NY: Routledge, 81-90).
• “The Superstitious Lawyer’s Inference.” In Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation (2020, Routledge)
• “Just Following the Rules: Collapse/Incoherence Problems in Ethics, Epistemology, and Argumentation Theory.” In Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen (2020, Windsor Studies in Argumentation series)
• “Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemic Normativity.” In Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications (2020, Rowman & Littlefield)

Journal and Encyclopedia Articles:

• “Arguments from Ignorance, Coverage, Bubbles, and Dogmatism.” (2026, Informal Logic 40 (1): 101-115).
• “Hermeneutical Injustice and Epistemic Basing Failure.” (2025, Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentacion 5: 6-19).
• “Epistemic and Legal Normativity: Reasons, Guidance, Rights, and Capacities.” (2025, TOPOI 44 (3): 853-862).
• “Can Rational Persuasion Be Epistemically Paternalistic?” (2024, Philosophy & Rhetoric 57 (4))
• “Avoiding Epistemology’s Swamping Problem: Instrumental Normativity without Instrumental Value.” (2022, Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1)).
• “Epistemology’s Prime Evils.” (2021, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11)
• “Deeply Disagreeing with Myself: Synchronic Intrapersonal Deep Disagreement.” (2021, TOPOI 40)
• “The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.” (2021, Synthese 198)
• “Epistemic Value.” (2021, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Originally published 2015; substantial revision in 2021 supported by WSU ARCS grant)
• “Epistemic Defeat.” (2019, Oxford Bibliographies, co-authored with Dustin Olson)
• “Replies to Godden, Rocha, Henning, and Ye.” (2019, Syndicate Philosophy. An invited symposium on my book, Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity.)
• “The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.” (2018, American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3), co-authored with J. Adam Carter)
• “Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification.” (2018, Synthese 195 (9), co-authored with Duncan Pritchard.)